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Digest: People v. Towne
Ryan Mcintire
Opinion by George, C.J., with Baxter, J., Werdegar, J., Chin, J.,
Moreno, J., and Corrigan, J. Concurring Opinion by Kennard, J.
Issues
(1) Did the trial court violate a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial under Cunningham v. California by determining
aggravating circumstances related to defendant's recidivism in imposing
the upper term sentence?
(2) Did the sentencing court violate a criminal defendant's state and
federal constitutional rights by relying on evidence underlying offenses of
which defendant was acquitted?

Facts
On April 1, 2002, defendant Shawn Towne was picked up by Noe
Arana while working as a prostitute. 1 Defendant tied up Arana, got into the
driver's seat, took his wallet and personal identification numbers to his
credit cards, and drove the car to a convenience store to use an ATM. 2
Arana escaped and called the police, who arrested defendant later that day. 3
Defendant was charged with eight crimes, including kidnapping and
robbery. 4 He was acquitted of all counts except "joyriding" in violation of
Vehicle Code section 10851(aV He waived his right to a jury trial and
admitted that he had several prior convictions. 6 The probation report
recommended the maximum sentence of four years based on aggravating
factors of service of a prior prison term, commission of the current offense
while on probation or parole, and unsatisfactory performance while on
probation or parole. 7 The trial court selected the upper term sentence based
on the circumstances that the victim had been afraid for his life and that
defendant had a lengthy criminal history. 8
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Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court's finding that the
victim was afraid for his life conflicted with the jury's acquittal of all
counts involving force or violence. 9 The Court of Appeal affirmed,
concluding that any error was harmless because the trial court properly
relied on defendant's criminal history. 10 The Supreme Court of California
granted review and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 11
Analysis
1. Factual Findings of Recidivism Factors Under Cunningham
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Cunningham v. California, held that any
aggravating factor subjecting a criminal defendant to an upper-term
sentence must be "established by the jury's verdict, the defendant's
admissions, or the defendant's prior conviction." 12 In People v. Black13 , the
Supreme Court of California held that only a single aggravating factor must
be established under Cunningham to pass Sixth Amendment scrutiny,
"regardless of whether the trial court considered other aggravating
circumstances in deciding to impose the upper term." 14 Black also held that
the Almendarez-Torres 15 exception for the fact of a prior conviction allows
a trial court to determine whether a defendant's convictions are "numerous
or of increasing seriousness." 16
The Court reasoned that, under Black, the trial court properly relied on
the two aggravating factors that defendant's prior convictions were
numerous and that he had served prior prison terms. 17 The Court clarified
that the Almendarez-Torres exception applies to all of the aggravating
factors listed in the probation report. 18 The Court reasoned that most state
and federal appellate courts have not limited this exception to the "mere
fact of a prior conviction" but allow a judge to "make factual findings on a
variety of issues that are related to a defendant's recidivism." 19
The Court also distinguished recidivism-related factors from other
sentence-enhancing factors for three reasons: (1) recidivism has
traditionally been used to increase an offender's sentence; (2) recidivism
"does not relate to the commission of the charged offense"; and (3) prior
convictions are established with procedural safeguards. 20 However, the
Court clarified that performance on probation or parole will not be accepted
!d. at 15.
/d.
ll/d.atl5,25.
12 !d. at 15 (citing 549 U.S. 270 (2007)).
13 People v. Black, 161 P.3d 1130 (Cal. 2007).
14 !d.
15 Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
IIi Towne, 186 P.3d at 16 (quoting People v. Black, 161 P.3d 1130)).
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from a jury trial if that circumstance can be established only by evidence
apart from the defendant's prior convictions. 21
2. Factual Findings Underlying Acquitted Charges
The Court then addressed defendant's contention that the trial court
could not constitutionally consider factors in imposing the upper sentence,
which the jury had implicitly found untrue. 22 The Court noted that the
Courts of Appeal are split over whether "a sentencing court can rely upon
facts underlying charges on which the defendant was acquitted."23 The
Court, disapproving Takencareof, reasoned that a sentencing court has
"broad discretion" to consider relevant evidence underlying a charge of
which the defendant was acquitted. 24 The Court reasoned that the trial
court did not violate defendant's Sixth Amendment right in doing so
because other aggravating factors supported the upper term. 25
The Court rejected defendant's argument that permitting a judge to
consider such evidence undermines the jury's role as a fact-finder. 26 The
Court reasoned that the trial court was not thereby "correcting" the jury's
verdict because it was limited by that verdict in imposing a sentence. 27
Holding
The Court held that the trial court did not violate defendant's state and
federal Constitutional rights, including his Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial, by imposing the upper term sentence. 28
Concurrence
Justice Kennard agreed with the majority that the Sixth Amendment
provides no protection for the recidivism-related factors associated with
prior convictions. 29 He concurred simply to explain why the majority's
holding was consistent with his dissent in People v. McGee, a decision on
which the majority relied. 30 ln McGee, he dissented that the lack of
determination by a jury of two statutory elements of robbery violated
defendant's right to a jury trialY Unlike McGee, he explained, the factual
determinations of service of a prior prison term and being on probation or
parole while the crime was committed can be established by a criminal
!d. at21.
!d.
23 !d. at 21- 22 (discussing People v. Takencareof, 174 Cal. Rptr. 112 (Ct. App. 1981 ); People v.
Levitt, 203 Cal. Rptr. 276 (Ct. App. 1984)).
24 !d. at 23.
25 !d. at 23-24.
26 !d. at 24.
27 !d.
28 !d. at 12.
29 !d. at 25-26.
3!J !d. at 26 (citing 133 P.3d 1054 (CaL 2006)).
31 /d. at 26-27 (citing 133 P.3d 1054).
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record and not by defendant's conduct. 32 However, he said, as the majority
notes, unsatisfactory performance on probation or parole must be put
before a jury when it can only be determined by a defendant's conduct and
not from a conviction while on probation or parole. 33
Legal Significance
This decision broadly interprets the Almendarez-Torres prior
conviction exception, allowing trial courts to impose maximum sentences
based on aggravating circumstances related to a defendant's recidivism that
can be established by a criminal record and not solely by the defendant's
conduct. This decision also clarifies that a sentencing court has discretion
to consider relevant evidence underlying offenses of which the defendant
was acquitted. As a result of this decision, trial judges have greater leeway
in providing harsher sentences for criminal convicts.
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